

## Message Text

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SUBJECT PROPOSED CHANGES TO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

REFS (A) USNATO 0157 (DTG 130844Z JAN 77)  
(B) USNATO 0351 (DTG 211604Z JAN 77)  
(C) USNATO 0363 (DTG 211743Z JAN 77)

SUMMARY: IN THIS MESSAGE WE PROVIDE OUR PRELIMINARY COMMENT  
AND SUGGESTED CHANGES TO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1975 THAT  
WASHINGTON MAY FIND USEFUL IN FORMULATING POSITIONS WHEN  
FORMAL DRAFTING SESSIONS ON NEW MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE  
BEGIN NEXT MONTH. END SUMMARY.

1. THERE FOLLOW BELOW OUR COMMENT AND SUGGESTED CHANGES  
TO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1975 AS A BASIS FOR PREPARATION  
OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1977.

2. INTRODUCTION. NO SUBSTANTITIVE CHANGE NECESSARY.  
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3. LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT.  
ESSENTIALLY VALID BUT NEEDS SOME REVISION, PARTICULARLY  
TO REFLECT IN PARA 6 THAT THE DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND  
WARSAW PACT FORCES CONTINUES TO INCREASE. WE WOULD PROPOSE  
IN PARA 7 A MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE (THAT ALLIES WILL  
RESIST AS STRONGLY AS IN 1975) IN SUBSTITUTING THE  
FOLLOWING FOR THE SECOND CLAUSE DEALING WITH RESOURCE ALLOCATION:  
BEGIN QUOTE: .. IF ALLIES ALLOCATE MODEST, ANNUAL INCREASES IN  
REAL VALUE TO DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (3-5 PERCENT ANNUALLY)...END QUOTE

4. THE THREAT.

THE IS SHOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REVISE TO REFLECT MC APPRECIATION.

5. DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE.

WE WOULD PROPOSE TO INTRODUCE INTO THIS SECTION WORDING RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR NATO'S FORCES TO BE KEPT IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS, AND AVOIDING ANY IMPLICATION THAT THEY NEED BE CAPABLE OF DEALING ONLY WITH LIMITED AGGRESSION, MODIFYING PARAGRAPHS 20(A) AND (B) AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE: (A) THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS AND BE STRONG ENOUGH TO DETER AGGRESSION BY CONFRONTING ANY POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR WITH THE PROSPECT OF SUCH RESISTANCE THAT HE WILL BE COMPELLED TO WITHDRAW OR RISK FURTHER ESCALATION THAT, IF NECESSARY, WOULD INCLUDE THE CONTROLLED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. (B) THE PURPOSE OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY... IT SHOULD PROVIDE A READY SOURCE OF LIMITED AND CONTROLLED OPTIONS..END QUOTE

6. FACTORS DETERMINING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCES.

A. WE BELIEVE THE INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH (21), THE PARAGRAPH CONCERNING POLITICAL AND MILITARY INDICATORS (23), AND THE PARAGRAPH CONCERNING USE OF WARNING TIME (24) ARE SUITABLE IN THEIR PRESENT FORM. PARAGRAPH 25 (ON SURPRISE ATTACK) IS SUPERFLUOUS IN VIEW OF THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 23, AND SHOULD BE DELETED.

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PARAGRAPH 22 TOUCHES ON THE PROTRACTED DEBATE OVER DURATION OF WARNING. IT IS SUPPORTABLE WITH REFERENCE TO THE CURRENT EDITION OF MC-161, BUT IN ITS PRESENT FORM IS NOT VERY USEFUL. WE PROPOSE TO MODIFY IT TO NOTE THAT BEGIN QUOTE: A RANGE OF ATTACK POSSIBILITIES EXISTS: SHOULD THE SOVIETS ELECT TO FOREGO THE ADVANTAGES OF ADVANCE MILITARY PREPARATION, IT IS CURRENTLY ASSESSED THAT SOVIET CATEGORY A DIVISIONS... END QUOTE. ALSO, WE WOULD ADD TWO SENTENCES AT THE END OF THIS PARAGRAPH: BEGIN QUOTE: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE IN ADVANCE WHAT SORT OF COMPROMISE SOVIET PLANNERS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE BETWEEN UNREINFORCED ATTACK AND ATTACKING WITH MAXIMUM STRENGTH. ACCORDINGLY, ALLIANCE DEFENSE PLANNING SHOULD BE PREPARED TO HANDLE A RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES AND, KEEPING IN MIND THAT SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR RAPID REINFORCEMENT AND AUGMENTATION HAVE BEEN IMPROVING, NATO PLANNERS SHOULD USE CONSERVATIVE PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING DURATION OF WARNING. END QUOTE.

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B. WE WERE NOT ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME  
OF THE SECTION ON NATURE OF ATTACK AND DEFENSE -  
CONFLICT AT SEA (PARAS 29-32) IN 1975; IN ORDER TO MAKE THE POINT  
THAT NATO NAVAL FORCES SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR MORE THAN STRICTLY  
DEFENDING MARITIME LINES OF COMMUNICATION, WE WOULD ADDA SUBPARAGRAPH  
TO PARA 31 (BETWEEN PRESENT (B) AND (C)) AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE:  
SEEK OUT AND DESTROY HOSTILE MARITIME FORCES AS FAR FORWARD AS  
POSSIBLE. END QUOTE.

7. CHARACTERISTICS OF NATO FORCES.

A. WE PROPOSE IN THIS SECTION TO REINFORCE THE NEED FOR  
IMPROVED READINESS, ADDING A GENERAL SUBPARAGRAPH AT THE BEGINNING  
OF PARAGRAPH 34 AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE:

34. THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS...MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) READINESS. THE WARSAW PACT'S IMPROVING  
CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH AN UNREINFORCED ATTACK COMBINES  
WITH THE POLITICAL NECESSITY AND MILITARY SOUNDNESS OF  
DEFENDING WELL FORWARD TO REQUIRE MAINTAINING NATO FORCES  
IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS. THESE FORCES SHOULD BE  
ABLE TO OCCUPY THEIR DEFENSE POSITIONS ON SHORT NOTICE,  
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ARRIVING FULLY TRAINED, WELL ARMED AND EQUIPPED,  
PSYCHOLOGICALLY PREPARED FOR INTENSE COMBAT, AND BACKED  
UP BY ADEQUATE COMBAT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT. END QUOTE.

B. WE PROPOSE TO STRENGTHEN AND BROADEN THE  
LANGUAGE IN SUBPARAGRAPH 34 (D) PERTAINING TO THEATER  
NUCLEAR FORCES, ADDING REFERENCES TO THE NEED TO BE  
ABLE TO CARRY OUT LIMITED NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AND TO MAKE  
BEST USE OF RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES.  
SUGGESTED TEXT FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE:

(D) THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES PLAY AN ESSENTIAL ROLE IN THE NATO  
TRIAD. THEY SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT  
THEIR PART IN THE OVERALL DETERRENT POSTURE OF THE  
ALLIANCE AND POSSESS THE BROADEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF

CAPABILITIES, WHILE GIVING DUE ATTENTION TO THE BEST USE OF RESOURCES, TO COUNTER THE SPECTRUM OF THREATS POSED BY THE WARSAW PACT. THE FOLLOWING SHOULD CHARACTERIZE THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE:

- AN UNQUESTIONED ABILITY TO EXECUTE ITS PART SUCCESSFULLY IN NATO'S GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES;
- AN ABILITY TO CARRY OUT LIMITED NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, WITH DISCRIMINATION AND LIMITED COLLATERAL DAMAGE;
- SURVIVABILITY UNDER CONVENTIONAL, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR ATTACK;
- HIGH PEACETIME SECURITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS;
- BEST USE OF RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES.

THE FORCE STRUCTURE MUST BE SUCH AS TO PERMIT THE MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION BY NATO NATIONS, IN ORDER TO ASSURE BROAD DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND TO PROVIDE VISIBLE DEMONSTRATION OF COHESION AND SOLIDARITY. NATO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY THE MOST MODERN, EFFECTIVE COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS THAT ARE RESPONSIVE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND AIMED AT FACILITATING INTERACTION BETWEEN THEM. THERE SHOULD ALSO BE ADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE, ACQUISITION, AND INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS THAT SUPPORT EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. END QUOTE.

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C. SUBPARAGRAPH 34(E) CONCERNING REINFORCEMENT AND AUGMENTATION FORCES NEEDS MODIFICATION TO STRESS SPECIFIC IMPROVEMENT MEASURES AND TO LINK IT EXPLICITLY TO THE ISSUE OF WARNING TIME, NOT ONLY AS REGARDS DURATION OF WARNING (AS AT PRESENT) BUT ALSO TO HIGHLIGHT THE DETERRENT IMPACT OF ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES TO REINFORCE IN-PLACE FORCES RAPIDLY. SUGGESTED TEXT FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE:

(E) EARLY REINFORCEMENTS, INCLUDING RESERVE FORCES, SHOULD BE AVAILABLE (EITHER AS UNITS OR INDIVIDUALS) TO SUPPLEMENT NATO STANDING FORCES ON LAND, IN THE AIR AND AT SEA AND TO ENHANCE THEIR SUSTAINING CAPABILITIES. DETAILED PLANNING, EMPHASIZING USE OF CIVILIAN ASSETS, FOR THE TRANSPORTATION, RECEPTION AND ONWARD MOVEMENT OF THESE FORCES, SHOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY COMPLETE TO ENSURE THEIR BEST USE IN TIMES OF CRISIS OR WAR. IN MANY CASES, PREPOSITIONING OF COMBAT AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT WILL BE REQUIRED; WHEN THIS IS NOT FINANCIALLY FEASIBLE, PLANS FOR TRANSPORTATION

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OF EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY THESE FORCES SHOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE MOVEMENT PLANS OF UNITS THEMSELVES. PLANNING FOR REINFORCEMENT FORCES SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF MAXIMUM DETERRENT IMPACT IN A PRE-HOSTILITY SITUATION, AS WELL AS RAPIDLY INCREASING ALLIANCE WAR-FIGHTING CAPABILITIES. REINFORCEMENT AND AUGMENTATION FORCES SHOULD USE IDENTICAL STANDARDS FOR COMBAT READINESS AS STANDING FORCES, AND SHOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THEM. END QUOTE.

D. WE BELIEVE A CHANGE TO PARAGRAPH 34(H) (COMMAND AND CONTROL) IS NECESSARY TO STRESS THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE WARSAW PACT'S EW CAPABILITIES, AS FOLLOWS: BEIGIN QUOTE: (H) TO ACHIEVE CONTROLLED, COORDINATED AND EFFECTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS, NATO MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL AND SENSOR SYSTEMS MUST PROVIDE THE REQUIRED DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY, AND THE CAPABILITY TO FUNCTION IN A DENSE, ELECTRONIC WARFARE ENVIRONEMENT. END QUOTE.

8. RESOURCES AND THEIR USE.

A. SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE (LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT), WE BELIEVE AN EFFORT IS WARRANTED  
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TO TRY FOR A RESOURCE FORMULA OF 3 TO 5 PERCENT REAL ANNUAL INCREASE AND TO MAKE A MORE EXPLICIT LINKAGE BETWEEN RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND WARSAW PACT TRENDS. WE WILL TRY TO INTRODUCE SUCH LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH 38. WE HAVE ALSO ATTEMPTED TO DEFINE A MEANINGFUL FORMULA THAT WOULD INDICATE THE QUALITY OF DEFENSE SPENDING, BUT SO FAR THE VARIOUS RATIOS WE HAVE TRIED, E.G., INVESTMENT AS A PERCENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL, WOULD ONLY TEND TO OBFUSCATE THE MORE VIVID COMPARISONS OF REAL SPENDING.

B. THE ALLIANCE COOPERATION SUBSECTION MUST BE ALMOST COMPLETELY REWRITTEN IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A BROAD DEFINITION OF RATIONALIZATION, TO RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS MADE A START ON RATIONALIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION, AND TO EMPHASIZE PRESCRIPTIVE RATHER THAN DEFINITIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. WE

WOULD RETAIN PRESENT PARAS 45, 49, 50 AND 51 WITH MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES ( PARAS 46 AND 47 ON TECHNOLOGY ARE COVERED BELOW IN SECTION 8(C) OF THIS MESSAGE) AND WOULD ENTITLE THIS SECTION "ALLIANCE COOPERATION: RATIONALIZATION OF DEFENSE EFFORTS." THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE WOULD REPLACE THE PRESENT PARAGRAPHS 40 THROUGH 45 AND 48 THROUGH 51. BEGIN TEXT:  
"ALLIANCE COOPERATION: RATIONALIZATION OF DEFENSE EFFORTS"

40. SINCE PUBLICATION OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1975, AND IN RESPONSE TO THAT GUIDANCE, THE ALLIANCE HAS MADE A START IN IMPROVING RATIONALIZATION. DESPITE THIS START, NATO RESOURCES ARE NOT BEING EMPLOYED IN AN OPTIMUM MANNER, SINCE DEFENSE PROGRAMS ARE ORGANIZED FOR THE MOST PART ON A STRICTLY NATIONAL BASIS. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF AREAS WHICH HAVE NOT YET BEEN FULLY EXPLOITED AND WHERE A MORE ACTIVE APPROACH WILL PERMIT A MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF DEFENSE RESOURCES. THESE AREAS LIE IN THE FIELDS OF RATIONALIZATION OF DOCTRINE, TRAINING, CRISIS MANAGE-  
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MENT, COMMUNICATIONS, LOGISTICS AND CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING, AS WELL AS IN STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF ALLIANCE WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND IMPROVED FLEXIBILITY FOR EXISTING ALLIANCE FORCES. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF ACTIONS REQUIRED IN EACH OF THESE AREAS FOLLOWS IN SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS.

41. DOCTRINE. THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON ALLIED DOCTRINES SHOULD BE STRESSED, THROUGH THE USE OF TRAINING ASSETS AS BELOW, THROUGH EXERCISES AND THROUGH THE SYSTEMATIC REVIEW AND REFINEMENT PROCESS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION. THE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE HARMONIZED TACTICAL DOCTRINE THROUGHOUT THE ALLIANCE.

42. TRAINING. DESPITE SOME PROGRESS IN A FEW CIRCUMSCRIBED AREAS OF TRAINING, THE RATIONALIZATION BENEFITS OF INCREASED COMMON TRAINING HAVE YET TO BE REALIZED. NATIONS SHOULD SEEK FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO ENGAGE IN COMMON TRAINING ENTERPRISES, THROUGH THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE EURO/NATO TRAINING GROUP AND THROUGH OTHER BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE THE MOST COST-EFFECTIVE TRAINING POSSIBLE FOR ALLIED PERSONNEL AND THE USE OF TRAINING ASSETS IN THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF HARMONIZED ALLIED DOCTRINE FOR SPECIFIC WARFARE AREAS.

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43. CRISIS MANAGEMENT. THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM AND THE NATO CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ARE HIGHLY DEVELOPED AND ARE EXERCISED FREQUENTLY. HARMONIZATION OF NATIONAL ALERT AND MOBILIZATION SYSTEMS AMONG ALLIES, AND THEIR HARMONIZATION, IN TURN, WITH THE NATO MACHINERY, ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE A RAPID AND APPROPRIATE ALLIANCE RESPONSE IN TIME OF CRISIS, TENSION OR WAR. THESE SYSTEMS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE EXERCISED FREQUENTLY IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY.

44. COMMUNICATIONS. RATIONALIZATION OF ALLIANCE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS IS ESSENTIAL TO INSURING ADEQUATE LIAISON BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF THE ALLIANCE, AND IN ENABLING RAPID AND SURE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ALLIANCE FORCES. THE CARDINAL ELEMENTS OF COMMUNICATIONS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT MODER FORCES -- SPEED, INTEROPERABILITY, SECURITY, RELIABILITY, COMMON PROCEDURES AND FREQUENT EXERCISE TESTING -- ARE CURRENTLY BEING SATISFIED ONLY IN A SECRET

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MARGINAL AND SPORADIC MANNER. MOREOVER, THE ESCALATING COST OF RAPIDLY ADVANCING COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY ADDS IMPETUS TO THE NEED TO PURSUE ALL POSSIBLE COOPERATIVE AVENUES TOWARD ACHIEVING ECONOMIES IN THIS ESSENTIAL SUPPORT AREA. NATO MUST ADDRESS, AS A TOP PRIORITY GOAL, THE COMPLETE INTEROPERABILITY OF ALL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORTING COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ALLIANCE FORCES BY THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

45. LOGISTIC SUPPORT. INDIVIDUAL ALLIES LACK THE PRODUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES TO BASE AN ADEQUATE LOGISTIC SUPPORT POSTURE ON NATIONAL

EFFORTS ALONE. ACCORDINGLY, NATO REQUIRES GREATER INTEGRATION OF CONSUMER LOGISTICS ON AN ALLIANCE-WIDE SCALE. WHILE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY THE PROVISION OF ADEQUATE WAR RESERVES, WILL REMAIN AN INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY NATO MUST PROVIDE THE MACHINERY TO PULL TOGETHER THE NATIONAL LOGISTIC ASSETS THAT ARE AVAILABLE.

46. NATO FORCES MUST BE PROVIDED WITH A LEVEL OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT ADEQUATE TO ENABLE THEM TO BE FULLY EFFECTIVE IN THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE RESUPPLY PHASE. AT PRESENT, LEVELS OF WAR RESERVE STOCKS AND THEIR QUALITY AND POSITION COULD SERIOUSLY LIMIT NATO'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN A COHERENT DEFENSE IN FORWARD AREAS. REALISTIC USAGE RATES MUST BE ADOPTED AND ADEQUATE RESERVES MAINTAINED TO FILL THE EXISTING LACUNAE. STOCKS OF WAR RESERVE EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE MODERN AND COMPATIBLE WITH EQUIPMENT IN THE HANDS OF COMBAT UNITS. THEY SHOULD ALSO BE READILY AVAILABLE IN THE PROBABLE THEATER OF OPERATIONS AND BE RAPIDLY TRANSPORTABLE TO THE BATTLE AREA. END TEXT.

WE WOULD THEN INSERT PRESENT PARAGRAPH 49 AS THE FINAL PARAGRAPH ON LOGISTICS, FOLLOWED BY PRESENT PARAGRAPHS  
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50 AND 51 ON CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING. REGARDING THE LATTER, WE NOTE THAT THE SCEPC IS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP ITS OWN, MORE DETAILED "MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE" FOR APPROVAL BY THE COUNCIL IN SPRING 1977. WE WOULD THEN FOLLOW WITH SECTIONS ON FLEXIBILITY, STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY AND COOPERATIVE PROJECTS, AS FOLLOWS: RESUME TEXT:

50. FLEXIBILITY. OPTIMUM USE OF EXISTING FORCES IS COMPROMISED BY ORGANIZATIONAL, DOCTRINAL, TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS INTRODUCED BY NATIONS. THE MNCS' FLEXIBILITY STUDIES HAVE IDENTIFIED MANY OF THESE, WITH APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REMEDIAL ACTION. NATIONS MUST WORK TOWARD ELIMINATING THESE CONSTRAINTS BY CARRYING OUT THE MNCS' RECOMMENDATIONS. WHERE NATIONAL PLANS DO NOT INCLUDE REMEDIAL ACTION, AND WHERE OTHERWISE APPROPRIATE, THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD INCORPORATE FLEXIBILITY STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS INTO THEIR FORCE PROPOSALS.

51. STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY. LACK OF STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT REMAINS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES. BOTH STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY FACILITATE COOPERATION AMONG FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE AND ENHANCE THEIR OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, INTEROPERABILITY IS A MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR,



FOR ITS IS IMPERATIVE THAT AMMUNITION, MISSILES AND SPARE PARTS BE INTERCHANGEABLE; THAT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS FUNCTION WITH EACH OTHER; AND THAT AIRCRAFT AND VEHICLES CAN REFUEL AT ANY LOCATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. IN MANY AREAS, INTEROPERABILITY MEASURES OFFER A FASTER, THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY EASIER OR LESS COSTLY, ROUTE TO INCREASED COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS THAN THOSE OFFERED BY STANDARDIZATION. IN THE LONGER TERM, STANDARDIZATION WILL SIMPLIFY TRAINING AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT, INCLUDING MAINTENANCE, AND OPEN UP AVENUES FOR COST-SAVING JOINT ACTION AMONG MEMBER COUNTRIES.

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JOINT DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT WILL REDUCE THE WASTE AND INEFFICIENCY RESULTING FROM THE CURRENT MANY-NATIONED APPROACH TO EQUIPPING NATIONAL FORCES.

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52. THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY ARE EXTENSIVE, BUT INCREASED EFFORT IS REQUIRED. AN APPROPRIATE STARTING POINT IS A FORMAL AND CYCLICAL METHOD FOR WORK IN THE ARMAMENTS FIELD WHICH WILL PERMIT TIMELY ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL EQUIPMENT PLANS AGAINST NATO FORCE GOALS, THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR INTEROPERABILITY AND STANDARDIZATION, AND THE SCOPE FOR HARMONIZATION WITH OTHER ALLIES' PLANS AND PROGRAMS. BECUASE THE AREA REQUIREING STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY ATTENTION IS SO VAST, A SYSTEM FOR MILITARY EVALUATION OF THE DEGREE OF URGENCY FOR FULL STANDARDIZATION, AS OPPOSED TO THE ATTAINMENT OF EQUIPMENT INTEROPERABILITY, IS NECESSARY. ONLY BY PLACING PRIORITIES ON STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY NEEDS WILL ATTENTION AND EFFORT BE FOCUSED ON THOSE AREAS WHERE THERE CAN BE THE HIGHEST PAYOFF IN COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. ONCE CATEGORIZED,

NATIONS MUST CONCENTRATE ON THESE AREAS TO ASSURE THAT COMPLIANCE WITH STATED NATIONAL OBJECTIVES TOWARDS NATO INTEROPERABILITY AND STANDARDIZATION ACCRUES. AS A FURTHER STIMULUS TO STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY, THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO DEVELOP AND AGREE ON COMMON NATO WEAPONS  
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REQUIREMENTS--NATO'S FAILURE TO STANDARDIZE EFFECTIVELY ITS WEAPONS SYSTEMS IS PARTLY A RESULT OF NATO COUNTRIES HAVING DIFFERENT WEAPONS SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS AND TO END THE VEXING PROBLEM OF MEMBER STATES CONTINUING TO DEVELOP AND PROCURE EQUIPMENT WITHOUT ADEQUATE COORDINATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THIS LATTER ASPECT CAN BE CORRECTED BY AN AGREEMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THAT AFTER A GIVEN DATE NATIONS WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE FULL-SCALE DEVELOPMENT, PROCUREMENT, OR DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS INTENDED FOR USE IN THE ALLIANCE WITHOUT MAKING AN EFFORT TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR ALLIANCE STANDARDIZATION. ONLY THROUGH SUCH A MULTIFACETED APPROACH CAN THE DELETERIOUS EFFECT THAT THE CURRENT LACK OF STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY HAS ON MILITARY CAPABILITY --AS WELL AS ITS SIDE EFFECT ON RATIONALIZATION IN AREAS SUCH AS TRAINING AND LOGISTICS -- BE ELIMINATED. PROJECTS WHERE POLICY ISSUES, OBSTACLES AND DIFFICULTIES NEED HIGH-LEVEL DECISION FOR THEIR RESOLUTION SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE BROUGHT FORWARD IN NATO FOR MINISTERIAL ATTENTION.

53. COOPERATIVE PROJECTS. COOPERATIVE PROJECTS IN THE FIELDS OF ARMAMENTS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION REMAIN A PRINCIPAL METHOD OF INCREASED ALLIANCE EFFICIENCY THROUGH A BETTER USE OF RESOURCES; IN FACT, EQUIPMENT STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY ARE DOMAINS DIRECTLY LINKED TO ARMAMENTS COOPERATION. THERE IS IN THE FIELD TODAY AN EXCESSIVE DUPLICATION OF MILITARY HARDWARE ITEMS. IN THIS CONNECTION, IMPROVEMENT IN THE TWO-WAY STREET IN DEFENSE EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT IS ESSENTIAL. SUCH IMPROVEMENT REQUIRES A FULL SHARING OF ARMAMENTS PLANNING INFORMATION, ESTABLISHED COMMON NATO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, COMMON SELECTION PROCEDURES, AND AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE, ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, VARIOUS "BUY NATIONAL" IMPEDIMENTS TO DEFENSE PROCUREMENT. INCREASED USE OF LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTICIPATING IN, AND BENEFITING FROM, THE MANUFACTURE OF SELECTED DEFENSE ITEMS, AS WELL AS REMOVAL OF "ARTIFICIAL" RESTRICTIONS ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE WHICH INHIBIT THE ABILITY OF NATIONS TO ACHIEVE EARLY COLLABORATION ARE ALSO ESSENTIAL FACTORS. THESE TYPES OF AGREEMENTS, CERTAIN OF WHICH MAY, IN MANY CASES,  
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FITING FROM, THE MANUFACTURE OF SELECTED DEFENSE ITEMS, AS WELL AS REMOVAL OF "ARTIFICIAL" RESTRICTIONS ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE WHICH INHIBIT THE ABILITY OF NATIONS TO ACHIEVE EARLY COLLABORATION ARE ALSO ESSENTIAL FACTORS. THESE TYPES OF AGREEMENTS, CERTAIN OF WHICH MAY, IN MANY CASES,

BEST BE ACHIEVED THROUGH MULTILATERAL OR BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE BROADER NATO STRUCTURE, COULD HELP TO FORGE MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE LINKS BY STIMULATING INCREASED COOPERATION IN WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION. THUS, WHILE EACH NATION BEARS THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EFFECTING IMPROVEMENTS IN THE EQUIPMENT IT MUST PROVIDE FOR ITS FORCES, EACH MUST ALSO REMAIN FULLY COMMITTED TO THE CLEAR AND VITAL OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING THE BENEFITS TO ALL WHICH ACCRUE FROM COOPERATIVE ARMAMENTS ARRANGEMENTS. END TEXT. WE WOULD THEN CLOSE THIS SUB-SECTION WITH PRESENT PARAGRAPH 45.

C. WE SEE UTILITY IN MODIFYING THE SUBSECTION ON TECHNOLOGY (PARAGRAPHS 46-47) TO ADD A REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR GREATER EXCHANGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION, TO CONSIDER THE GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE TARGET ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE, AND TO PROVIDE BETTER INSTITUTIONAL LINKS BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR PLANNING FUNCTIONS, ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: BEGIN QUOTE:

46 NATO COLLECTIVELY NEEDS...MILITARY PAY-OFF APPEARS SIGNIFICANT. THIS WILL REQUIRE INCREASED NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO EARLY INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. THE KEY TO THIS COOPERATION IS GREATER EXCHANGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION, WHICH WILL NECESSITATE A REASSESSMENT OF CURRENT APPROACHES TO TRANS-ATLANTIC INDUSTRIAL TEAMING, ELIMINATION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC BARRIERS, AND FINDING A METHOD WHEREBY TECHNOLOGY IS LICENSED SO AS TO MAINTAIN NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL POSITIONS WHILE REDUCING THE WASTE OF MULTIPLE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORT.

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47 (NO CHANGE.)  
(FIRST ADDED PARAGRAPH AFTER 47.) IN ADDITION

TO STRESSING STANDARDIZATION OR INTEROPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT, NATO SHOULD CONSIDER THE GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE TARGET ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE. THIS CONCEPT RECOGNIZED THAT TARGET DESTRUCTION DEPENDS NOT ONLY ON HIGH DELIVERY ACCURACY AND SPECIALIZED WEAPONS EFFECTS BUT ALSO ON TIMELY INTELLIGENCE AND EFFICIENTLY MANAGED AND COMMITTED COMBAT RESOURCES. ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO AIR ASSETS, EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT ADDITIONALLY DEMANDS THE TECHNOLOGICAL AS WELL AS PROCEDURAL ABILITY TO ENGAGE TARGETS BEYOND NATIONAL CORPS BOUNDARIES. SUCH TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION ACROSS THE ENTIRE TARGET ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE THUS RELATES DIRECTLY TO ALL ASPECTS OF ALLIANCE COOPERATION DISCUSSED IN PARAS 40-45, BUT PARTICULARLY TO FLEXIBILITY, PARAGRAPH 42. (SECOND ADDED PARAGRAPH AFTER 47.) NATO SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THE QUALITATIVE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THE SECRET

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PURPOSES OF DETERRENCE AND THE POLICY OF DELIBERATE ESCALATION. HOWEVER, TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BOTH THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FIELDS HAVE BLURRED SOME PREVIOUS DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THEM, MAKING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS MORE DESTRUCTIVE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS MORE DISCRETE, AND IN BOTH CASES PROVIDING INCREASED OPTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WHICH WERE NOT PRESENT PREVIOUSLY. SIGNIFICANTLY, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS DEPENDED ON THE SAME ELEMENT OF THE TARGET ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE DESCRIBED ABOVE. NATO AND NATIONAL PLANNING BODIES, WHILE CONTINUING TO EMPHASIZE THE DETERRENT AND POLITICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SHOULD SEEK WAYS TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR PLANNING FUNCTIONS WITHIN NATO. THIS IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT FUTURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH BOTH CAPABILITIES, AS WELL AS TO TAKE BETTER ADVANTAGE OF THE INCREASED FLEXIBILITY AND OPTIONS WHICH NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS ARE PROVIDING. END QUOTE.

9. PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT.  
NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE NECESSARY.

10. PRIORITIES.  
WE BELIEVE A MAJOR REWRITE OF THIS SECTION IS REQUIRED TO SHARPEN PRIORITIES FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMPROVEMENTS AND TO HIGHLIGHT CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES, AND PROPOSE REVISING PARAGRAPHS 54, 55 AND 56 AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE:

54. A ROUGH EQUIVALENCE EXISTS BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC

NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE AND THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. THIS BALANCE MUST BE MAINTAINED THROUGH THE CONTINUING MODERNIZATION OF WESTERN FORCES WITHIN THE LIMITS PRESCRIBED IN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS.

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NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES WILL REQUIRE CONTINUED IMPROVEMENTS IN FLEXIBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY, BUT IN LIGHT OF THE UNPRECEDENTED GROWTH IN WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES, IT IS IN THE ALLIANCE'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAT MAJOR DEFICIENCIES LIE.

55. ATTAINMENT OF A CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY ESSENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE AND SUSTAINABLE IN THE LONG TERM REQUIRES AN INTEGRATED FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, CAPABLE OF ESTABLISHING CLEAR PRIORITIES FOR THE ALLOCATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES. CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IN NATO'S FORCES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND PRIORITIES FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION HAVE BEEN PRESENTED IN THE MILITARY APPRECIATION, THE FLEXIBILITY REPORTS, AND SACEUR'S COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, WHICH EMPHASIZE THE NEED TO (A) RATIONALIZE NATO'S FORWARD DEFENSE POSTURE, (B) IMPROVE READINESS AND SURVIVABILITY, (C) ENHANCE REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES, AND (D) MODERNIZE EQUIPMENT. IN DETERMINING THE ALLOCATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES, PRIORITY SHOULD BE ACCORDED THE CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED IN THESE REPORTS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO:

- MEASURES WHICH ENHANCE THE READINESS AND SURVIVABILITY OF IN-PLACE FORCES, REINFORCEMENT AND AUGMENTATION FORCES, AND READILY MOBILIZABLE RESERVES.
- STEPS TO IMPROVE THE AIR AND SEALIFT OF REINFORCEMENTS, THEIR RECEPTION AND ONWARD MOVEMENT;
- NATO COMMAND AND CONTROL;
- NICS,
- MODERN HEADQUARTERS,
- COLLOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS IN THE CENTRAL REGION.

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WITH EMPHASIS ON:

- INTEROPERABLE NATO MILITARY COMMAND AS WELL AS TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS,
- ANTI-ARMOR,
- LOW-LEVEL AIR DEFENSE,
- ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE.
- MEASURES WHICH PROVIDE A PRACTICAL STIMULUS TO INCREASED COORDINATION OF ALLIED DEFENSE EFFORTS AS DESCRIBED IN PARAS 40-45.

56. THE ABOVE CRITERIA REFLECT ALLIANCE-WIDE FORCE DEFICIENCIES. IN ESTABLISHING NATO FORCE GOALS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS, CONSIDERATION WILL HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO SPECIFIC WEAKNESSES AND SPECIAL CONDITIONS AT THE REGIONAL, NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVEL. END QUOTE

B. WE BELIEVE AN ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES WOULD ENCOURAGE THE NMAS TO BECOME MORE INVOLVED IN COUNTRY PLANS IN THE DEVELOPEMNT OF NATO'S FORCE PROPOSALS: BEGIN QUOTE:  
(NEW PARA FOLLOWING 56.) WHERE AVAILABLE RESOURCES ARE INSUFFICIENT  
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TO REMEDY THESE CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES, APPROPRIATE TRADE-OFFS MUST BE CONSIDERED WITHIN NATIONAL PROGRAMS TO FREE RESOURCES FOR HIGHER PRIORITY ALLIANCE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS. END QUOTE.

11. GUIDANCE.

A. WE BELIEVE THE SUBSECTION FOR NMAS SHOULD BE EXTENSIVELY REVISED, PARTICULARLY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD PREPARE THEIR FORCE PROPOSALS WITH THE AIM OF REMEDYING THE WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 55 AND TO PRESENT THESE PROPOSALS IN A MORE COHERENT AND USEABLE MANNER. WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING REVISIONS TO PARAGRAPHS 59-64: BEGIN QUOTE:

59. (MINOR EDITING TO THE FIRST TWO AND LAST TWO TICKS, AND REPLACE THE MIDDLE THREE TICKS WITH THE FOLLOWING):

- REFLECT THE FORCE IMPROVEMENT AREAS OUTLINED IN PARA 55 AND THE REQUIRED CHARACTERISTICS DESCRIBED IN PARA 34;
- ARE DIRECTED TOWARD REMEDYING SPECIFIC AREAS OF WEAKNESS ON A REGIONAL AS WELL AS AN ALLIANCE-WIDE BASIS, STRESSING, WHERE APPLICABLE, A COORDINATED, REGIONAL APPROACH WHICH SPANS THE ENTIRE TARGET ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE AS DESCRIBED IN (NEW) PARA 48;
- PROVIDE FOR CONTINUING MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR FORCES, BUT PLACE PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMPROVEMENTS;
- TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE MORE COMPLEX GROWING INTERFACE BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES.

60. THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARE INVITED TO DEVELOP FORCE PROPOSALS WHICH NATIONS CAN IMPELMENT WITHIN EXISTING LEVELS OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES PLUS ANNUAL INCREASES IN REAL TERMS FOR EACH NATION OF 3-5 PERCENT.

61. IN FORWARDING THEIR FORCE PROPOSALS FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD GROUP THE PROPOSALS, WHERE PRACTICALBE, BY FUNCTIONAL AREAS CORRESPONDING TO THE CRITERIA SET FORTH IN PARA 55, AND INDICATE EXPLICITLY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSALS WOULD CORRECT THE DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED IN THE ABOVE-REFERENCED  
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ASSESSMENTS(1). IN ADDITION TO FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIZATION, FORCE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE GROUPED IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, WITH ONLY A CAREFULLY LIMITED NUMBER (NO MORE THAN 1/5) OF THE PROPOSALS ACCORDED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY.

(1) THE MILITARY APPRECIATION, THE FLEXIBILITY REPORT, AND SACEUR'S COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT.

62. WHERE EXPECTED RESOURCES ARE INSUFFICIENT TO REMEDY CRITICAL FORCE DEFICIENCIES, THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARE INVITED TO RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE TRADE-OFFS WITHIN NATIONAL PROGRAMS THAT WOULD FREE RESOURCES FOR MORE PRESSING ALLIANCE DEFENSE REQUIRMENTS.

63. WHERE WEAKNESSES IN ALLIANCE DEFENSE POSTURE CAN BE CORRECTED MOST EFFECTIVELY THROUGH COOPERATIVE EFFORTS, MULTILATERAL IMPROVEMENT MEASURES SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED IN THE PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION OF FORCE PROPOSALS.

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64. IN THEIR PLANNING FOR THE FLEXIBLE USE OF ALLIED FORCES, THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD CONSIDER ALL NATO FORCES WHICH COULD EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ALLIANCE.

65. (RETAIN PARA 64 FROM LAST GUIDANCE AND RENUMBER 65.) END QUOTE

B. THE SUBSECTION GUIDANCE FOR NATIONS NEEDS AMENDMENT TO REFLECT RESOURCE GUIDANCE OF 3-5 PERCENT REAL ANNUAL INCREASE AND SOME FINE TUNING ON THE PARAS ADDRESSING COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, AND TO PROD NATIONS TO IMPROVE THEIR MOBILIZABLE FORCES AND TO MAKE TRADE-OFFS WITHIN NATIONAL PROGRAMS IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE PRIORITY NATO FORCE GOALS. WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING REVISIONS TO PARAGRAPHS 67-73: BEGIN QUOTE:

67. ADD A CONCLUDING PHRASE: ...AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 40 TO 45. (NEW PARAGRAPH FOLLOWING 67.) NATIONS SHOULD EXAMINE EXISTING MANPOWER PROGRAMS IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE EMPLOYMENT OF TRAINED RESERVES IN THE TIMELY SUPPORT OF STANDING FORCES AND THE CONTRIBUTION THAT THESE RESERVES AND LOCAL MILITIA COULD MAKE TO A STRENGTHENED DEFENSE IN DEPTH.

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68. NO CHANGE. (NEW PARAGRAPH FOLLOWING 68.) NATIONS SHOULD SUPPORT A CONSUMER LOGISTICS FORUM.

69. CHANGE TO READ: IN ADDRESSING THE ADEQUACY OF WAR RESERVE STOCKS, THE STANDARDS SET OUT IN PARA 48 TO 49 SHOULD BE FOLLOWED.

70. CHANGE TO READ: ADDITIONAL STEPS TOWARD STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED IN PARA 43 TO 44.

71. AND 72. NO CHANGE.

73. CHANGE TO READ: THE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THE AIMS DESCRIBED IN PARAS 66 TO 72 ABOVE SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE ALLOWING FOR APPROPRIATE ANNUAL INCREASES OF FROM 3 TO 5 PERCENT IN REAL TERMS IN NATIONAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES.

(NEW PARAGRAPH FOLLOWING 73.) WHERE AVAILABLE RESOURCES, INCLUDING ANNUAL REAL INCREASES OF 3 TO 5 PERCENT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO FUND PRIORITY NATO FORCE GOALS, NATIONS SHOULD CONSIDER TRADE-OFFS WITHIN NATIONAL PROGRAMS. END QUOTE.

C. WE SUGGEST THE ADDITION OF A NEW SUBSECTION THAT WOULD PROVIDE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR THE DPC, AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE:

THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE IN PERMANENT SESSION SHOULD:



- IN ITS EXAMINATION OF FORCE PROPOSALS AND NATIONAL FORCE AND FINANCIAL PLANS, ASSESS SPECIFICALLY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THESE PROPOSALS AND PLANS CONFORM TO THE DIRECTIVES SET FORTH IN THIS DOCUMENT;

- CONTINUE TO MONITOR PROGRESS TOWARD FURTHER RATIONALIZATION OF ALLIANCE DEFENSE EFFORTS;

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- PURSUE MEASURES TO PROMOTE AN EFFECTIVE INTERFACE BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR PLANNING FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE;

- SEEK WAYS TO PRESENT MORE EFFECTIVELY ALLIANCE DEFENSE NEEDS, EFFORTS, AND CAPABILITIES TO PUBLICS AND PARLIAMENTS. END QUOTE.  
STRAUSZ-HUPE

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